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COURT OF APPEALS, 1956 TERM
the rights of defendant." Some of it was considered objectionable as pure hearsay,
as statement of conclusion not susceptible of proof, and as proof of special damages
not pleaded. But the overall ground for ruling it inadmissable was the lack of proofthat these reactions were directly caused by the alleged libel. It was held that
even if the Bishop position were to be taken as law, this evidence of aversion
failed to meet its standards; the incidents were not sufficiently shown to be "the
direct and well-connected result of the libel." The Court was particularly concerned
with the inability of a defendant adequately to meet such testimony by a plaintiff
and suggested that testimony. by those persons supposed to have acted adversely
to plaintiff, and demonstration through such testimony of connection to the libel,
if such demonstration be possible, would be more acceptable because it would
afford defendant an adequate opportunity of cross examination.
In the dissent, evidence of aversion manifested as a consequence of libel
was held admissable to show general damages, a conclusion with which the
majority did not disagree. It is not clear whether the minority felt that the
incidents described by plaintiff had been sufficiently proven as direct results of
the alleged libel, or whether they felt that proof of direct causality was unnecessary
to allow such evidence. The admission of the evidence in question was considered
harmless, since it did not touch on the primary issue at the trial, and it was not
considered to have been adequately objected to.
Macy v. New York World-Telegram Corporationhas to some extent clarified
the law as to the admissability of evidence to support the presumption of general
damage in libel actions. The Court was careful not to commit itself but made it
apparent that evidence of adverse reaction to plaintiff following the alleged libel
may be introduced if it is in the proper form. If the evidence of aversion is in
the form of testimony by those persons supposed to have manifested the
aversion and meets the usual rules of evidence, then it would probably be held
admissable. But if the examples of aversion are to be put before the jury by"
the testimony of plaintiff, then a clear showing of direct causal connection to
the alleged libel-would seem to be required for admission of the testimony
into evidence.
Admissibility Of Evidence Of Religious Faifh in Certain Libel Actions
In Toomey v. Farley,54 a libel action, defendants were respectively the
incumbent Democratic Party office holder and several members of his organization
who, during a primary campaign, published a political "newspaper" containing
statements allegedly to the effect that plaintiffs, who were an opposing candidate
and one of his workers respectively, were Communists or fellow travellers.
Verdict and judgment of the Trial Term were for plaintiffs. The Appellate
54. 2 N.Y.2d 71, 156 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1956).
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Division, 55 upon plaintiff's consent to a reduction in the amount of the verdict,
ordered that the judgment appealed from be modified, and as so modified,
affirmed.
The issue over which the Court of Appeals split (4-3) concerned the
admission of evidence as to the religious affiliation and activities of plaintiffs.5 0
Defendants had conceded that plaintiffs were not Communists and that this fact
was not in issue. Nor had defendants attempted to show that plaintiffs were of
bad reputation in order to mitigate damages. Plaintiffs were allowed to testify
rather extensively, however, that they were members of the Catholic Church,
attended faithfully, and were active in various collateral church organizations.
Upon the first objection to this testimony, the trial judge allowed it on the ground
that it went to show that plaintiffs were not Communists. But when defendants
persisted in their objections, he stated that he was allowing the testimony as
bearing upon the question of damages.
The majority held that, while ordinarily the injection into the trial of the
religious faith and observances of a party would constitute ground for reversal, in
this case such testimony was competent "to show the circumstances surrounding
the plaintiff, and as bearing upon the hurtful tendency of the libel, and the
general damage to which he was exposed, ' 57 especially because charges of
attachment to Communism while participating in church affairs would picture
plaintiffs as hypocrites; and thus that, since such evidence was admissable, the
extent of examination of the subject was discretionary with the trial judge, and
in this case could not be said to have improperly influenced the verdict or to
have constituted an abuse of discretion as to require reversal.
In the dissenting opinion it was granted that allowing of testimony of
membership in the Catholic Church, even though an encroachment on traditional
policy against the entry of race and creed as factors in trials, did not constitute
legal error in this case; but it was felt, however, that the testimony was allowed
to exceed the limits of its proper function of establishing church membership
and to go so far as to become in fact an appeal to the sympathy of the jury in
Toomey v. Farley, 286 App. Div. 1084, 147 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1st Dep't 1955).
56. There was no disagreement as to the holding that one of the defendants
was not improperly deprived of his right to counsel in the selection of the jury.
55.

Counsel for his fellow defendant had acted in behalf of his offlce associate, who

was himself a defendant but was acting as counsel for the objecting defendant, In
the impanelment and had apparent authority to do so. On the objection the next
day no attempt was made to deny that he did not have authority to represent
the objecting defendant.
57. The court is quoting Morey v. Morning Journal Ass'n, 123 N.Y. 207, 210,
25 N.E. 161, 162 (1890).
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order to gain punitive damages. Several cases58 were cited in which there had
been a reversal because of the improper injection into the trial of the religion
or nationality of a party or witness. None of these were libel actions, however,
and in none of these cases did religion have any relevance whatsoever. But it
was felt by the dissenting judges that the testimony in the instant case had taken
on the improper character that brought about reversal in the cases cited.
There seemed to be no substantial disagreement in the Court of Appeals as
to the general principles applicable to the admissability of this type of testimony;
the split in opinion resulted from a difference in emphasis and interpretation
of the circumstances of the trial. It is well settled in most jurisdictions that a
plaintiff can show his position in the community as bearing on the question of
general damages.59 The case"0 mainly relied upon by the majority was a libel
action based on a newspaper article to the effect that plaintiff was faced with
the possibility of a "breach of promise" suit in which it was held that evidence
that plaintiff was a married man was properly admitted "to show the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff, and as bearing upon the hurtful tendency of
the libel, and the general damage to which he was exposed." This was a leading
case in New York and its ruling was extended in Saunders v. Post Standard Co.6 1
in which it was held proper for the trial court to allow evidence that plaintiff
was supervisor of his town, a member of the State Legislature, and a trustee of
the Methodist Episcopal Church, as bearing upon general damage caused by
an allegation of cruelty to animals. The problem of religious bias was not raised
in this case, however.
The testimony in the instant case, in referring to the extent of plaintiffs'
activity in their church, went well beyond that of any precedent New York
libel cases. Since the testimony was at least to a certain extent relevant as to
general damages, especially since belief in Communism while participating in
church affairs would constitute hypocrisy, the Court was confronted with the
problem of whether such evidence is of sufficient probative value, as weighed
against the danger of its abuse to inject religious prejudice, as to be admissable
at all. Toomey v. Farley held that its admission requires reversal only when it
appears that religious prejudice has actually become an element in the particular
case. But on the basis of this holding it seems that each new case will be tested
58. Malinski v. People of State of New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); People v.
Esposito, 224 N.Y. 370. 121 N.E. 344 (1918); Bowen v. Mahoney Coal Corp., 256
App.Div. 485, 10 N.Y.S.2d 454 (Ist Dep't 1939); Abbate v. Solan, 257 App.Div.
776, 15 N.Y.S.2d 332 (2d Dep't 1939); Saunders v. Champlain Bus Corp., 263
App.Div. 683, 34 N.Y.S.2d 447 (3d Dep't 1942).
59. 53 C.J.S. Libel And Slander §H190(c), 264 (1948). The problem is
discussed and several cases are gathered in Press Publishing Co. v. McDonald
63 Fed. 239 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1894).
60. Morey v. Morning Journal Ass'n, 123 N.Y. 207, 25 N.E. 161 (1890).
61. Saunders v. Post-Standard Co., 107 App.Div. 84, 94 N.Y. Supp. 993 (4th
Dep't 1905).
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according to its own circumstances, and a decrease in the probative value of the
testimony in question or a clearer showing that it was used to incite the prejudice
of the jury, could easily result in reversal
Violation Of Local Traffic Ordinance-Evidence Of Negligence

New York City traffic regulations 2 establish a right of way in favor
of pedestrians over automobile drivers at crossings not protected by a police
officer or a traffic light. In Taggart v. Vogel,63 plaintiff was struck by defendant's automobile while crossing at such an intersection. The Court of
Appeals held (6-1) that the refusal of the trial judge to charge these regulations
and his instructions to apply the same standard of care to both parties amounted
to reversable error. The Court stated that the above regulations increased the
responsibility of drivers, and a violation amounted to some evidence of negligence.
The effect which the Court gives to local traffic regulations in this case
tacitly reaffirms the established principle that although the violation of a local
ordinance will not amount to negligance per se,64 it is relevant as amounting to
some evidence of negligence on the part of the violator.65
Negligence-Question Of Fact
In Levine v. City of New York, 60 the Court was faced with the problem of
determining whether the referee or the Appellate Division 7 made the appropriate
findings of facr.0s It held in agreement with the referee that it was more
probable than not that the defendant was negligent. Judgment was therefore
entered in favor of the plaintiff on the reinstated referee's report. This conclusion,
because it involves only a factual appraisal, leaves no room for comment.0 9
Negligence-Incidental Injuries
Zipprich v. Smith Trucking Company and Creaser v. Smith Trucking
Company,70 personal injury actions arising out of the same accident, were tried
62. NEW YORK CITY TRAFFIC REGULATIONS §77.
63. 3 N.Y.2d 58, 163 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1957).
64. Fluker v. Ziegele Brewing Co., 201 N.Y. 40, 93 N.E. 1112 (1911).
65. Carlock v. Westchester Lighting Co., 268 N.Y. 345, 197 N.E. 306 (1935).
66. 2 N.Y.2d 246, 159 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1957).
67. 1 A.D.2d 661, 147 N.Y.S.2d 684 (1st Dept 1955).
68. Section 605 of the Civil Practice Act compels the Court of Appeals to
review findings of fact when the Appellate Division finds new facts In modifying
or reversing the trial court.
69. For an interesting discussion of this case on a prior appeal, 309 N.Y. 88,
127 N.E.2d 825 (1955), see 5 BUFFALO L. REv. 240 (1956), wherein the writer asserts
that the Court strained to allow recovery under the guise of the Invitee theory
when really applying the attractive nuisance doctrine which is not acceptable In
the New York courts.
70. 2 N.Y.2d 177, 157 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1956).

